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COLLOQUIUM 
CIVIL LITIGATION ETHICS 
AT A TIME OF VANISHING TRIALS 
INTRODUCTION 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS 
BEYOND THE VANISHING TRIAL:  
UNREPRESENTED CLAIMANTS, DE FACTO 
AGGREGATIONS, ARBITRATION MANDATES, 
AND PRIVATIZED PROCESSES 
Judith Resnik* 
I.  DIFFUSING DISPUTES AS TRIALS VANISH 
Trials are a vivid variable in the world of litigation, as reflected in the 
title of this colloquium, Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing 
Trials.  The conveners have wisely drawn attention to the disjuncture 
between legal ethics and today’s litigation world.  In this Introduction, I 
argue that the challenges for lawyers loom larger than those reflected in the 
declining rate of trials.  More facets of contemporary dispute resolution 
need to be engaged when contemplating the topics and roles that legal 
ethics need to address in the decades to come. 
Below, I sketch the contours of practices in state and federal courts, 
where millions of litigants appear in civil cases without attorneys.  When 
clients are represented, they are often grouped by judges and lawyers into 
aggregates, created through a variety of methods, both formal and informal.  
 
*  Many thanks to Bruce Green for inviting me to participate in the colloquium entitled Civil 
Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham University School of Law 
and to the participants for a lively and insightful exchange.  Thanks for help on research and 
thinking through this and related projects is due to Jonah Gelbach, Deborah Hensler, Sam 
Issacharoff, Andrew Bradt, and members of the staff of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts and of the Federal Judicial Center—Emery Lee, Carol Krafka, Donna Stienstra, 
Wendell Skidgel, and Brad Sweet, as well as to Yale Law Librarian Michael VanderHeijden; 
to Denny Curtis, Vicki Jackson, and Abbe Gluck; to a wonderful group of students with 
whom I have learned a great deal—Matt Butler, David Chen, Kyle Edwards, Clare Kane, 
Marianna Mao, Urja Mittal, Heather Richard, Iva Velickovic, Regina Wang, Emily Wanger; 
and to Bonnie Posick, for her expert editorial assistance. 
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As this colloquium’s title reflects, trial rates are down; one in one hundred 
federal civil cases goes to trial.  Less in focus is that case filings are also 
flattening and for an array of reasons, one of which is that millions of 
potential claimants are prevented from pursuing claims collectively (either 
in courts or in arbitration) because of provisions in job applications and 
consumer documents precluding class actions. 
To the extent people do go to court, they are often greeted by mandates to 
resolve disputes privately.  Courts are now venues in which public 
adjudication has taken a back seat to alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 
which generally takes place outside the public purview.  Agencies are 
another important venue of adjudicatory procedures, where tens of 
thousands of adjudications take place.1  Many of their proceedings also 
involve unrepresented parties, and many agencies’ hearings are not readily 
accessible to the public. 
In short, vanishing trials are but a piece of the privatization and 
relocation of process.  In an earlier article, I used the term “dispute 
diffusion” to capture the eclipse of adjudication in courts as the central 
paradigm of government-based dispute resolution.2  I further argued that a 
variety of sources are producing this new policy through statutes, federal 
and state regulations, procedural rulemaking, and by way of court-made 
doctrine.  In the 1980s, I identified a shift to “managerial judges”3—
deploying judges to become conciliators.  In addition, other individuals are 
enlisted to serve as “neutrals” or as arbitrators, both in and out of courts.  
More recently, I identified an array of provisions, which I called 
“Alternative Civil Procedure Rules” (ACPR), that organize these diverse 
sets of practices but do so through a maze of different promulgations.4  
Rather than an accessible and public codification, of which the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure are an iconic example, the ACPR are hard to find 
and to piece together.  But taken collectively, the ACPR—like the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure—reflect norms about what procedural systems 
should do.  The ACPR value privatized processes.  Further, unlike 
contemporary rule systems based in courts, the ACPR neither address the 
 
 1. A new, ambitious database, which is a joint project of the Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS) and Michael Asimow at Stanford Law School, seeks to catalog, 
compare, and describe formal and informal federal agency adjudication and the federal 
administrative judiciary.  The searchable materials (coming from the agencies) include data 
on caseloads, time to disposition, and legal representation.  The database compiles 
information from each agency separately; our tally is that it includes 110 federal agencies 
reporting pending caseloads. See Caseload Statistics, STAN. U.:  ADJUDICATION RES., https:// 
acus.law.stanford.edu/reports/caseload-statistics (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https:// 
perma.cc/5NA3-F59N]; see also Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing:  The 
Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 783 (2004) [hereinafter Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing]. 
 2. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:  The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2807–08 (2015) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]. 
 3. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); see also Judith 
Resnik, Failing Faith:  Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986). 
 4. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2807. 
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needs of indigent users nor attend to making a place for public observers to 
attend proceedings.5 
Lawyers representing clients as well as those serving as judges are the 
sources and the objects of many of the developments and new rules.  
Lawyers’ ethical codes speak of lawyers as zealous advocates6 and as 
officers of the courts, obliged to support the administration of justice.7  
Ethical codes likewise ask judges to work to improve the courts.8  
Admission to the bar in some states is conditioned on providing public 
service, and judges around the country have called attention to the 
difficulties of an underfunded, underlawyered legal system.9 
All of these shifts that I have sketched (and that I will discuss more 
below) change both the roles of lawyers and the prices of certain forms of 
lawyers’ work—producing new markets and reducing the relevance of 
others.  The doctrine, legislation, and procedural rules marginalize 
constitutional norms of open and public courts—practices that have long 
served to regulate both lawyers and judges by enabling public observation 
of and therefore debate about the processes and outcomes of the decisions 
that result.  Elsewhere I have detailed the resulting power asymmetries; this 
colloquium brings questions of lawyers’ ethics to the fore.  
Can and will lawyers impose regulation on themselves in response?  
Ought regulations be placed instead in statutes and court rules?  And what 
shape should such provisions take, with what potential impact on the norms 
of lawyering and the body politic?  This colloquium offers a series of 
articles responding to aspects of these new and daunting challenges. 
II.  DEPICTING THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE 
OF CIVIL LITIGATION 
A few charts and brief commentary provide a picture of the dockets of 
the state and federal courts.  Figure 1 is important to frame the discussion 
here because it helps to bring state and federal courts—and the ethics of the 
 
 5. See id. at 2807–08. 
 6. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“The duty 
of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously 
within the bounds of law.”). 
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR. ASS’N 1983) (“A lawyer, as a 
member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system 
and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”). 
 8. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A 
judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 
judiciary . . . .”); id. Canon 2, r. 2.2 (“A judge shall uphold and apply the law . . . .”). 
 9. In New York, for example, “[e]very applicant admitted to the New York State 
bar . . . shall complete at least 50 hours of qualifying pro bono service prior to filing an 
application for admission with the appropriate Appellate Division department of the 
Supreme Court.” N.Y. CT. R. § 520.16(a); see also JONATHAN LIPPMAN, THE STATE OF THE 
JUDICIARY 2015:  ACCESS TO JUSTICE:  MAKING THE IDEAL A REALITY (2015), http:// 
www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/SOJ-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6L6Q-M9VU]; Deborah L. 
Rhode, Cultures of Commitment:  Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2415 (1999). 
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lawyers who practice before them—into view.10  As its title reflects, it is a 
snapshot of the volume of filings in federal and state trial courts in 2010. 
 
Figure 1:  Comparing the Volume of Filings:  
State and Federal Trial Courts, 2010 
  
 
 10. Federal information was gathered from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  
Data on the state filings came from the National Center for State Courts.  The number of 
state filings was an estimate. This figure was also published in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, 
supra note 2, at 2833 fig.2. 
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The figure details that about 360,000 civil and criminal cases were filed 
in the federal trial-level courts in 2010, along with more than a million 
bankruptcy petitions.  State filings numbered more than 47 million, and that 
figure excludes what figure 2 includes—filings that states have catalogued 
as juvenile and traffic cases.11 
 
Figure 2:  State Trial Court Filings, 1976–2008 
 
 11. Data were gathered from the National Center for State Courts’s annual reports, and 
these figures are estimates as not all states report data in all categories.  This figure was also 
published in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2833 fig.3.   
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What do we know about who brings cases and how they are handled?  
Given the volume of activity in state courts, the development of national 
data is challenging.  Yet the National Center for State Courts provided a 
window through its 2015 publication, The Landscape of Civil Litigation in 
State Courts, which analyzed almost a million cases that were disposed of 
during 2012–2013 in ten major urban counties.12  As the report details, 
most of the cases concluded within a year.  In most, at least one party was 
without a lawyer, and most of the dispositions were administrative 
conclusions, rather than by trials or other forms of adjudication. 
Figure 3 brings the work of state courts into focus by providing details 
about state court filings.13  This chart highlights some of the major findings 
of the report, specifically that about two-thirds of the filings involved 
contract claims and that more than one-half of that set of claims were 
landlord-tenant and debt collection cases.14  The more recent survey 
contrasts with the 1992 data collection, when about half of the claims 
analyzed were tort cases.15  The National Center for State Courts’s 2012–
2013 data put tort cases at 7 percent.16 
  
 
 12. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & STATE JUSTICE INST., CIVIL JUSTICE INITIATIVE:  
THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS, at iii (2015) [hereinafter STATE 
COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION]. 
 13. Data for figure 3 were drawn from Civil Justice Initiative:  The Landscape of Civil 
Litigation in State Courts. See STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at 
17–20; see also Judith Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”:  Federal and 
State Courts in Our Federal System, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1831, 1929 n.481 (2016) 
[hereinafter Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage”]. 
 14. See STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at iii. 
 15. The 1992 data were drawn from case outcomes in the seventy-five “most populous 
counties” in the country.  Of about 762,000 tort, contract, and property dispositions, 
approximately 378,000 were tort cases. See STEVEN K. SMITH, CAROL J. DEFRANCES, 
PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN A. GOERDT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF 
STATE COURTS, 1992:  TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES 6 (1995), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/TCILC.PDF [https://perma.cc/N4KL-WQ7A]; see also CAROL J. 
DEFRANCES, STEVEN K. SMITH, PATRICK A. LANGAN, BRIAN J. OSTROM, DAVID B. ROTTMAN 
& JOHN A. GOERDT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992:  
CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2 (1995), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC5J-MBBR]. 
 16. STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at iv. 
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Figure 3:  National Center for State Courts:  
The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, 2015 
 
As to the parties, information was available about the presence of lawyers 
in about 650,000 cases.  In most, “at least one party was self-represented, 
usually the defendant.”17  The researchers found that the results of the 
lawsuits were that, in about three-quarters of the judgments, the sums were 
 
 17. Id.  In 1992, attorneys had represented both parties in 95 percent of the cases; in 
2012–2013, in 24 percent of the cases. See id. at 31; see also CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT 
ADM’RS & NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 
31–32 (version 2.0 2014). 
925,344 civil cases, 10 major urban counties 
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under $5,200.  As for the means of resolution, the study reported that 4 
percent were disposed of by trials.18 
The data on other forms of dispositions are what social scientists call 
“noisy,” in that about a quarter have an “unspecified judgment,” and the 
grounds for the 35 percent dismissed or the 10 percent settled were not 
obvious from the court documents.19  Yet overall, the National Center for 
State Courts’s analysis resonates with the discussion in this colloquium by 
Taunya Banks about civil trials as “a film illusion.”20  Further, the numbers 
put into sharp relief the importance of identifying the ethics of settlement, 
as Howard Erichson analyzes, “in the absence of anticipated 
adjudication.”21 
Turn then to the federal courts, where the arena to study is narrower, the 
resources are greater, and hence more data are available.  A first point is 
that an assumption of the federal courts as crowded and overworked is not 
supported by the aggregate data.  Filings in the federal court system, which 
had more than doubled between 1970 and 1985, have experienced little 
growth in the last three decades.  An overview of filings in the U.S. district 
courts during the last century is provided in figure 4.22 
 
 18. STATE COURT 2012–2013 CIVIL LITIGATION, supra note 12, at 20.  Adjudication for 
these purposes included a judge or jury trial, summary judgment, and binding arbitration.  In 
the 1992 survey, 62 percent of the cases were disposed of through settlements, and 3 percent 
were disposed of by judge or jury trial.  Thus, of the almost one million cases, 32,124 trials 
took place, of which 1109 (3 percent) were jury trials, and 31,015 (97 percent) were bench 
trials.  Jury awards exceeded $500,000 in 17 (3 percent) of the cases, and 75 percent of the 
jury awards in tort cases were below $152,000. The 2012–2013 study also noted that, as 
contrasted with 1992, both parties were represented in 24 percent of the bench trials. Id. at 
iv, 20–25. 
 19. Id. at 20–21.  The dismissal rate recorded in the 2012–2013 study was more than 
three times higher than that recorded in the 1992 study, and the settlement rate was less than 
one-fifth of that recorded in the 1992 study. Id. at 21.  The authors of the 2012–2013 study 
noted that differences in methodology may account for the different results.  The newer 
study collected data from courts with limited rather than general jurisdiction, and that 
selection affects the cases that fell into the study. Id.  Further, data for the 2012–2013 study 
were taken from case management systems rather than through researchers looking at 
individual court files, as they had in 1992. Id. at 22.  Therefore, the study’s authors reported, 
“It is particularly difficult to interpret the dismissal and unspecified judgment rates in the 
[2012–2013] study.” Id.  For instance, the study explains that litigants may request that 
settled cases be dismissed with prejudice and that cases with these designations were 
classified as settlements in the 2012–2013 study but that if the cases were coded in the case 
management systems as dismissals, the study would do so as well. Id.  Moreover, the study 
reports that “unspecified judgments may include a substantial proportion of cases that were 
actually default judgments.” Id. 
 20. Taunya Lovell Banks, Civil Trials:  A Film Illusion?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1969 
(2017). 
 21. Howard M. Erichson, Settlement in the Absence of Anticipated Adjudication, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2017 (2017). 
 22.  While the number of filings is a function of multiple variables, based on the increase 
in population and new federal causes of actions, one would expect an increase in filings.  
The stagnancy observed instead therefore suggests a decline in federal filing, a phenomenon 
other scholars have noted, alongside a shift in the mix of cases. See Patricia W. Hatamyar 
Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1180; 
cf. Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; or, the Federal Courts Since the Good 
Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 921, 924. This figure, like some of the others in this 
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Figure 4:  Growth Rate of Federal District Court Filings, 1905–2015 
In the most recent fifteen years, civil and criminal filings ranged from 
about 300,000 to 360,000 cases per year.  In 2015, 279,036 civil cases were 
filed,23 and the federal government brought more than 60,000 criminal 
cases,24 of which about a quarter involved multiple defendants.25 
 
Introduction, has been used in other articles I have written. See, e.g., Resnik, Revising Our 
“Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1910 fig.13.   
 23. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1 (2015) [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C01 
Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN9H-WUWL]. 
 24. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.D (2015) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2015 tbl.D], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/D00CSep15.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/M5F3-CG24]. 
 25. In 2015, the U.S. government commenced prosecutions against 80,069 defendants. 
U.S. COURTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.D-1 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/data_tables/D01FugSep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8XA-PBZ6].  The number of 
cases filed was 61,202. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.D, supra note 24. 
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The contemporary filings are about half of what a 1995 projection had 
anticipated, which predicted that more than 610,000 cases would be filed by 
2010.26  As the bar graph in figure 5 depicts, the filings in 2010 (361,323 
cases) were higher than the 340,238 cases brought in 2015.27 
  
 
 26. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 15 tbl.3 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourtslongrangeplan_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y3L3-T9DS].  The 1995 Long Range Plan is also reprinted in the Federal 
Rules Decisions. See 166 F.R.D. 49 (1995).  Subsequent references refer to page numbers as 
printed in the original document. 
 27. This figure is derived from multiple sources.  Data for 1995 projections of 2010 
filings were derived from the 1995 Long Range Plan. See 1995 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE 
FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 26, at 15 tbl.3.  Data for 2010 actual filings and 2015 actual 
filings were derived from Administrative Office of the United States. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2015 tbl.D, supra note 24; see also U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
2015 tbl.C (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C00Sep15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2V64-WQZX]; U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS:  ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 138, 204 tbls.C & D (2010), http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/JudicialBusinespdfversion_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y3CJ-LGEF]. Note that criminal filings are of cases, not defendants. 
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1995 projections 
of 2010 filings 
2010 actual 
filings 
2015 actual 
filings 
610,800 361,323 340,238 
Figure 5:  1995 Projections of 2010 Federal Filings 
and Actual Federal Filings, 2010 and 2015 
Moreover, the actual workload—as measured on a metric of cases per 
active Article III district court judge28—varies greatly across the United 
States.  The judiciary has gathered data on its own caseloads for decades, in 
part to document for Congress the need to authorize more judgeships.29  To 
 
 28. See Moore, supra note 22, at 1189 (discussing the complexity of measurement).  
 29. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:  Transforming the Meaning 
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 938 (2000). 
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do so, the courts developed a system of “weighted [civil] filings by 
authorized judgeships.”30  While distinguishing antitrust and patent cases 
from student loan and other civil suits, as well as from criminal 
prosecutions,31 this record-keeping system has not yet used as factors 
 
 30. The federal judiciary began to use a system of weighted filings in 1946, a few years 
before the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts began its work.  Judges were asked 
periodically to do “time diary studies” with timesheets. See Explanation of Selected 
Terms, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/explanation_of_selected_terms 
_september_2016_0.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7EVW-T6A6].  A 
revised system—whose output is reflected for the last decade of data charted in figure 5—
was put into place in 2004 and based on analyses of cases terminated in 2002. Id.  The new 
approach uses an events-analysis approach.  The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) developed the 
weightings by calculating “the sum of all weights assigned to civil cases, criminal 
defendants, and supervised release hearings” and then dividing those sums “by the number 
of authorized Article III judgeships assigned to each district.” U.S. District Courts—Judicial 
Business 2015, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-
judicial-business-2015 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/CV8Y-444E].  As also 
explained by the federal judiciary’s administrative wings, case weights are a predictive 
measure of the time a judge will spend on a case.  For example, the average civil or criminal 
case is assigned a weight of 1.00, while “[m]ore time-consuming cases” receive higher 
weights and “cases requiring relatively little time from judges receive lower weights.” Id. 
  In March of 2016, the Judicial Conference of the United States (JCUS) adopted a 
new case weighting system, meant to “fine-tune its requests for new district judgeships.” 
Judicial Conference Addresses Judgeship Needs Issues, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 15, 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/03/15/judicial-conference-addresses-judgeship-needs-
issues [https://perma.cc/T3Y7-E5KN].  According to Carol Krafka, who directs the FJC’s 
district court case weighting studies, “the re-evaluation was prompted simply by the need to 
update weights that had not changed since they were adopted in 2004 . . . and we knew from 
analyzing more recent data that there had been changes in the demand that certain case types 
placed on district judge time.” E-mail from Carol Krafka, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to author (Oct. 
5, 2016, 2:05 PM) [hereinafter Krafka, Oct. 5 E-mail] (on file with the Fordham Law 
Review). 
 31. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., COMPARISON OF EXISTING AND PROPOSED UPDATED CASE 
WEIGHTS BY CASE TYPE (2016) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).  In designing the 
new weighting system, the federal judiciary relied on a 2015 FJC study that included 
objective data from nearly 300,000 civil and criminal case terminations regarding 
the amount of time required to conduct trials and other proceedings such as 
evidentiary hearings or pretrial conferences, and also included subjective measures 
based on a survey of approximately 220 active district judges regarding their 
estimates of the time required to perform case-related work in chambers. 
Judicial Conference Addresses Judgeship Needs Issues, supra note 30. 
  In the 2016 case weighting system, the weights assigned to a number of types of 
civil cases decreased, including for patent, environmental, FOIA, and death penalty habeas 
corpus matters, while the weights assigned to many criminal case type categories increased. 
See Krafka, Oct. 5 E-mail, supra note 30. 
  The method of computing weights comes through deputy court clerks, sitting in 
court at all hearings, conferences, and trials at which a district judge presides.  No such data 
are recorded for the work judges do in chambers. E-mail from Carol Krafka, Fed. Judicial 
Ctr., to author (Nov. 16, 2016, 1:48 PM) [hereinafter Krafka, Nov. 16 E-mail] (on file with 
the Fordham Law Review).  As Krafka explained, in the 2014 revisions, the courts assigned a 
value for the time spent on events that were recorded on the docket in the cases analyzed and 
did so through surveying a selected sample of active district court judges who were asked to 
estimate the times spent on various activities, such as discovery motions in different types of 
cases.  Then, case weights were computed by summing “the time associated with all of the 
proceeding and non-proceeding events docketed in a large sample of cases” and categorizing 
“individual cases into case types” to determine averages of time spent within a case time, so 
as to have “the basis for (non-normalized) weights.” Id. 
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whether a litigant is unrepresented32 or whether a case is grouped with other 
cases or is a certified class action.33 
But what the current methods do show is a significant variability in 
dockets, as figure 6 depicting five district courts evinces.34  As is detailed, 
life-tenured judges in active status in the District of Columbia had, between 
2001 and 2015, about 200 cases per authorized judgeship; in the Central 
District of California, such judges had more than 600 cases.  These 
measures neither include the contributions of Article III judges who have 
taken senior status nor of magistrate judges.35 
 
 
  For more on the method’s development, see generally PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL 
KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003–2004 DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY (2005), 
and Philip Habel & Kevin Scott, New Measures of Judges’ Caseload for the Federal District 
Courts, 1964–2012, 2 J.L. & CTS. 153 (2014). 
 32. The data collected by the Administrative Office denote unrepresented individuals as 
“pro se.”  Pro se district court filings were not counted in either the 2004 or 2016 weighting 
systems. See E-mail from Brad Sweet, U.S. Cts., to author (Oct. 2, 2016, 1:35 PM) 
[hereinafter Sweet, Oct. 2 E-mail] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).  In contrast, the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts adjusts for pro se cases in its calculation of 
weighted caseloads for appellate courts, with pro se case filings weighted as taking one-third 
of the time of non-pro se filings. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-862T, 
FEDERAL JUDGESHIPS:  THE GENERAL ACCURACY OF DISTRICT AND APPELLATE JUDGESHIP 
CASE-RELATED WORKLOAD MEASURES (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657661.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U3WB-AYJE]. 
 33. Weights “are assigned only to those cases in district courts that arise as original 
proceedings, by removal from state court, or by interdistrict transfer” and hence exclude 
cases stemming from “reopenings, remands, appeals from magistrate judgments, or transfers 
by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.” U.S. District Courts—Judicial 
Business 2015, supra note 30; see also Sweet, Oct. 2 E-mail, supra note 32.  As Sweet 
explained, because the weighted case data include only cases that originate in a particular 
district court, cases that are removed to the district court from state court, cases that are 
transferred from another district, and multidistrict litigation (MDL) cases transferred into a 
district court for pretrial are all not included in the weighted case data. Sweet, Oct. 2 E-mail, 
supra note 32.  However, individual cases, when filed, that become part of an MDL or if 
remanded back for trial thereafter are counted in the weighted case law through the 
“original” proceeding measure.  MDLs are a part of an assessment of the need for new 
judgeships by way of the U.S. Judicial Conference’s Judicial Resources Committee, which 
seeks to consider both quantitative and qualitative impacts (including some analysis of a 
district’s weighted caseload with and without the inclusion of MDL cases), in part to assess 
whether an influx in filings is temporary.  MDLs also have some impact on case weight 
computations. See Krafka, Nov. 16 E-mail, supra note 31. 
 34. These data come from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts. See Caseload 
Statistics Data Tables, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-
statistics-data-tables (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (search by table number “X-1A”; then, to 
access the data, click on the report corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/5L5R-
2G2N]. 
 35. “Authorized Article III judgeships” excludes senior judges and magistrate judges, 
and this metric also does not take into account law clerks or staff attorneys. See Stephen B. 
Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970–2009:  The Choices 
Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 23–31 (2012) (detailing the significant workload contributions of senior judges); 
see also Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”:  Inventing the Federal District 
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 
607, 615–16 (2002). 
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Figure 6:  Weighted Civil Filings per Authorized Judgeship, 2001–2015 
 
In addition to this kind of disuniformity, a remarkable amount of civil 
litigation in the federal courts is clustered together, consolidated under the 
1968 “multidistrict litigation” (MDL) statute36 and distributed in an uneven 
pattern to specific district court judges around the United States.  
Understanding the prevalence of aggregation in the federal courts requires a 
shift from looking at filings to analyzing pending cases.  In contrast to the 
flattening filings in the last three decades, the number of pending civil cases 
(tracked in figure 7) has grown—more than tripling between 1970 and 2015 
and increasing from about 300,000 cases in 2010 to 341,813 cases in 
2015.37 
 
 
 36. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 37. The data from 1972 to 1990 come from Annual Reports of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States.  For the data for 1991 to 2015, see Caseload Statistics Data Tables, 
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2017) (search by table number “C-6”; then, to access the data, click on the 
report corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/5L5R-2G2N].  Data for each year 
between 1968 and 1990 are for the year ending in June 30; data for each year between 1991 
and 2015 are for the year ending in September 30.  I am in the midst of writing about the 
relationship between class actions and MDLs and the role played by aggregation more 
generally, and this chart is drawn from drafts of those articles, forthcoming in essays on class 
actions. 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Central District
of California
Southern District
of New York
Eastern District
of Pennsylvania
Southern District
of Texas
District of DC
2017] ETHICS BEYOND THE VANISHING TRIAL 1913 
Figure 7:  Total Civil Cases Pending 
in Federal District Courts, 1972–2015 
 
But tens of thousands of these cases are not dealt with individually.  
Rather, as of the fall of 2015, almost 40 percent of federal civil cases were 
part of MDLs,38 created when a panel of judges ruled that the statutory 
criteria for pretrial aggregation (“civil actions involving one or more 
common questions of fact . . . pending in different districts”) were met.39  In 
1968, Congress authorized the Chief Justice to designate seven federal 
judges to serve on the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML), 
which decides whether to transfer pending cases to one judge and selects 
 
 38. Specifically, 132,788 cases out of 341,813 pending cases were MDLs. U.S. JUDICIAL 
PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
FISCAL YEAR 2015 (2015) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015], http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML 
_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2015_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C92L-
GR8G]; see also JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1, supra note 23. 
 39. Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1911 
(citing STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 
38, then quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)). 
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specific federal district court judges to preside during the pretrial phase over 
the cases so grouped.40  As the essays by Lynn Baker, Theodore Rave, and 
Adam Zimmerman in this colloquium discuss,41 these mandatory, non-opt-
out, pretrial aggregations are run by court-appointed lead lawyers—a 
Plaintiff Steering Committee (PSC) or Plaintiff Executive Committee 
(PEC)—functioning as ad hoc law firms and representing a significant 
number of plaintiffs who had filed individual lawsuits.42 
The growth of the aegis of MDL is significant, as is charted in figure 8, 
which shows the relationship between the pending civil docket and cases 
grouped together in MDL proceedings.43  In 1991, fewer than 2,232 cases 
(or about 1 percent of the civil docket) were part of MDL proceedings.44  In 
2013, about a third of the caseload was in MDL proceedings.45  By 
September 2015, the percentage had risen again.  Of 341,813 federal civil 
cases pending, 132,788 were concentrated in 271 proceedings aggregated 
before a single judge.46 
  
 
 40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d). 
 41. See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1943 (2017); D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2175 (2017); Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2275 (2017). 
 42. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
71, 88–89 (2015); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, Foreword:  Multidistrict Litigation and 
Aggregation Alternatives, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 877, 880 (2001); Judith Resnik, Dennis 
Curtis & Deborah Hensler, Individuals Within the Aggregate:  Relationships, 
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 321 (1996); see also Judith Resnik, From 
“Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 23 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, 
From “Cases to “Litigation”]. 
 43. The data on pending civil cases come from the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts. See supra note 37.  The MDL data for 1972 to 1990 are from the Annual Reports of 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  For the MDL data from 1991 to 2015, 
see Statistical Information, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., http:// 
www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/SA7W-
A6CJ].  Data for each year from 1972 to 1990 are for the year ending on June 30; data for 
each year from 1991 to 2015 are for the year ending on September 30. 
 44. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL PANEL 
ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1991). 
 45. See Hatamyar Moore, supra note 22, at 1214.  For further discussion on the 
increased use of aggregate litigation, see Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From 
Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations:  Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 
58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 776 (2010), and Emery G. Lee III, Catherine R. Borden, Margaret 
S. Williams & Kevin M. Scott, Multidistrict Centralization:  An Empirical Examination, 12 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 214 (2015). 
 46. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-1, supra note 23, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS 
BY DISTRICT (2015), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets 
_By_District-October-15-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QWJ-6VY4]. 
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Figure 8:  Pending Cases in the Federal Civil Docket and 
Multidistrict Litigation, 1972–2015 
 
In 2015, for example, more than 150 judges were assigned one MDL; 28 
had two MDLs each; and 10 had three or more, some of which involved 
different manufacturers of a product alleged to be harmful.47  Thus, the 
assumption that cases are randomly assigned to individual district judges 
 
 47. To calculate the number of MDLs per judge, we relied on the “Summary by Docket 
of Multidistrict Litigation Pending as of September 30, 2015, or Closed Since October 1, 
2014.” See STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra 
note 38.  After tabulating the numbers presented in the report in an Excel spreadsheet, we 
were able to generate a pivot table wherein we could filter the data for active MDLs only and 
then calculate the number of MDLs each judge was assigned.  One judge was assigned seven 
cases involving mesh used in pelvic surgeries. See Id. 
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(and in some districts, also to magistrate judges “on the wheel”),48 does not 
apply during the pretrial process for this large segment of the docket.49 
Another facet of the federal courts is the absence of lawyers in a 
significant portion of the federal docket.  As can be seen in figure 950 and 
figure 10,51 more than 25 percent of the plaintiffs filing civil cases in 
federal courts do so without counsel at the trial level;52 more than 50 
percent seek appellate review without lawyers’ assistance.53  
 
 48. The image of assignments as random—at both trial and appellate levels—is not 
always reflected in practice in other areas. See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, 
Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2015) (identifying assignments that undermine the “long-standing 
assumption of panel randomness”). 
 49. It should be noted that a few MDLs have played a disproportionate role in 
contributing both to the federal docket and to the overall number of MDLs.  Specifically, the 
asbestos MDLs, at their height, numbered 59,227 in 2008. U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 
2008 (2008), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Statistical%20Analysis 
%20of%20Multidistrict%20Litigation_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UUV-FLND].  In 2015, 
the product liability litigation on transvaginal mesh—in seven MDLs before the Honorable 
Joseph R. Goodwin in the Southern District of West Virginia—numbered 73,080. See 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION FISCAL YEAR 2015, supra note 38.  
Each of the seven MDLs corresponded to a different defendant:  C.R. Bard, Inc. (MDL-
2187); American Medical Systems, Inc. (MDL-2325); Boston Scientific Corp. (MDL-2326); 
Ethicon, Inc. (MDL-2327); Coloplast Corp. (MDL-2387); Cook Medical, Inc. (MDL-2440); 
and Neomedic (MDL-2511). Id. 
 50. Data for the years 2004–2014 were taken from the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts by searching table C-13 for each of the corresponding years. See Judicial Business, 
supra note 52.  The categories provided by the Administrative Office are “Prisoner 
Petitions” and “Nonprisoner Petitions.” This figure also appears in Resnik, Revising Our 
“Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1914. 
 51. Data for the years 1996–2014 were taken from the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts by searching table B-19 for each of the corresponding years. See Judicial Business, 
U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business (last visited Mar. 25, 
2017) (search by table number “B-19”; then, to access the data, click on the report 
corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/2XGZ-2XFU].  Data for 1995 were from 
table 2.4 in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts of Appeals Judicial Facts and 
Figures. See JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.2.4, supra note 53.  The categories 
provided by the Administrative Office are “Criminal,” “Prisoner Petitions,” “U.S. Civil,” 
“Private Civil,” “Bankruptcy Appeals,” “Administrative Agency Appeals,” and “Original 
Proceedings” including miscellaneous applications. Id. This figure also appears in Resnik, 
Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13, at 1913. 
 52. The federal district court database details pro se filings back to 2005.  Every year 
with data has seen at least 25 percent of civil cases filed by unrepresented plaintiffs. See 
Judicial Business, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicial-business (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2017) (search by table number “C-13”; then, to access the data, click on the 
report corresponding with each year) [https://perma.cc/YF2Z-8E2M]. 
 53. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.2.4 (2014) [hereinafter 
JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.2.4], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files 
/table_2.04_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E3H-25ZQ].  As noted, I have sought to draw attention 
to the challenges of litigation by individuals with modest sums in my other articles. See, e.g., 
Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers:  A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in 
Numbers]; see also Resnik, Revising Our “Common Intellectual Heritage,” supra note 13. 
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Figure 9:  Filings by Unrepresented Plaintiffs 
in the U.S. District Courts, 2004–2015 
 
Figure 10:  Filings by Unrepresented Plaintiffs 
in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1995–2015 
 
Disaggregated by circuits, the range runs from about one-third to nearly 
two-thirds of the filings.54  These numbers include both thousands of 
 
 54. As of September 30, 2015, 51 percent of cases commenced in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals were pro se at the time of filing. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.B-9 
(2015) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.B-9], http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/ 
files/data_tables/B09Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NKS-BFHF].  Disaggregating by circuit, 
the D.C. Circuit had the lowest percentage of pro se filings (33 percent), while the Fourth 
Circuit had the highest percentage (64 percent). Id. 
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prisoner filings and many cases brought by people who are not 
incarcerated.55  Thus, the analyses of lawyer activities by Andrew Pollis56 
and Morris Ratner,57 and of the impact of new rulemaking on discovery 
discussed by Danya Reda,58 need to be read with an understanding that 
these issues relate to a small set of cases, which could be thought of as akin 
to luxury goods.59  Moreover, the concerns of Susan Saab Fortney about the 
need for “prying open” courthouse doors for legal malpractice claims are 
amplified.60  Despite efforts made by a subset of clients to increase 
regulation of lawyers through new kinds of claims and to reduce costs 
through litigation budgets, most people cannot afford lawyers, let alone 
pretrial discovery. 
Commentators on procedure have labeled the contemporary era the “age 
of austerity.”61  In the United States, state courts have been the focus of 
concern.  States are strapped for funding, and their courts have millions of 
litigants without lawyers.  State judiciaries have established task forces on 
access to courts.  Reports indicate that more than four million civil litigants 
in California courts lacked lawyers in 2009,62 and more than two million 
such litigants were unrepresented in New York courts.63 
My hope is to enlarge the lens so that the federal courts are also brought 
into such discussions.  Comparatively, federal courts are rich in terms of 
buildings, staff, and judges.  Yet, federal judges regularly report worry 
about resources and now face a significant proportion of litigants who 
appear in court without lawyers. 
 
 55.  For example, in 2014 and in 2015, nonprisoners filed 24,274 and 25,117 cases pro 
se, respectively. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.C-13 (2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/C13Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R 
PU-4AT3]; U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014 tbl.C-13 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/C13Sep14.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7SX-KWFL]. 
  On appeal, nonprisoner, noncriminal cases consisted of 44 percent of all pro se cases 
filed. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.B-9, supra note 54.  Nonprisoner, noncriminal cases 
consist of the following categories:  “Other U.S. Civil,” “Other Private Civil,” “Bankruptcy,” 
“Administrative Agency Appeals,” and “Original Proceedings” including “Miscellaneous 
Applications.” 
 56. See Andrew S. Pollis, Busting Up the Pretrial Industry, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097 
(2017). 
 57. See Morris A. Ratner, Retraining Lawyers:  From “Cases” to “Tasks,” 85 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2151 (2017). 
 58. See Danya Shocair Reda, What Does It Mean to Say That Procedure Is Political?, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2203 (2017). 
 59. See BEYOND ELITE LAW:  ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN AMERICA (Samuel Estreicher 
& Joy Radice eds., 2016) [hereinafter, BEYOND ELITE LAW]. 
 60. See Susan Saab Fortney, A Tort in Search of a Remedy:  Prying Open the 
Courthouse Doors for Legal Malpractice Victims, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2033 (2017). 
 61. See, e.g., Xandra Kramer & Shusuke Kakiuchi, General Report for the XV World 
Congress of Procedural Law:  Relief in Small and Simple Matters in an Age of Austerity 5 
(July 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2610773 [https://perma.cc/JQB8-BW4W]. 
 62. A.B. 590, 2009–10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). 
 63. Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil Legal 
Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 15 (2013). 
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The other structural fact about today’s litigation landscape is that, as in 
this colloquium’s title referencing “vanishing trials,” almost no civil cases 
reach trial in the federal courts.  As of 2015, about 1 in 100 civil lawsuits 
filed began a trial before either a judge or a jury.64  In terms of numbers, 
2,852 civil bench and 1,882 civil jury trials were completed in 2015; the 
count on the criminal side was 5,027 bench trials and 1,807 jury trials.65 
Because federal data collection neither makes time-study tracking easily 
available nor readily identifies cases by more than one kind of category of 
cause of action or by class action status, it is difficult to know which cases 
go to trial, let alone why that subset does so.  An account of federal 
litigation would be enriched by understanding more about the 2,000 to 
3,000 cases that are tried yearly—in terms of whether the litigants are 
represented, in classes or MDLs, the subject matter and stakes of the claims, 
and their distribution across the United States.66  Many assume that all 
filings without lawyers result in dismissal, that cases which do go to trial 
include lawyers, or that no class actions go to trial.  Here, I discuss a review 
of the 2,973 cases identified in a database provided by the Federal Judicial 
Center67 and reporting on cases ending with a trial during the year between 
October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015. 
Let me start with litigants lacking lawyers.  About 15 percent (450 cases) 
in this one-year snapshot of trial data were categorized as having at least 
one party unrepresented, and 0.6 percent (18 cases) had at least one party on 
both sides unrepresented.68  Less than 2 percent of tried cases (43 cases) 
 
 64. I am in the midst of other work trying to gain insights from inquiring into the cases 
that actually went to trial.  Thus, we examined data released by the FJC on all civil cases. 
See Federal Court Cases:  Integrated Data Base, 2014 (ICPSR 36110), NAT’L ARCHIVE 
CRIM. JUST. DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/NACJD/studies/36110 (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5A7P-2JZD].  This dataset tracks 4.6 million civil cases 
brought between 1996 and 2015.  Within this dataset, we counted 69,200 cases commencing 
a jury or bench trial by picking cases with values 6, 7, 8, and 9 in the “PROCPROG” 
column.  Therefore, 1.5 percent of cases in the dataset proceeded to trial. 
 65. U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2015 tbl.T-1 (2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/data_tables/T01Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CY-YMTF].  Recall that data 
from the state courts put the rate of civil trials as the mode of disposition in about 4 percent 
of the cases analyzed. 
 66. See Emery Lee, FJC FY 2015 Termination Data (Sept. 2016) (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review).  These data are to be posted sometime in 2017 on a new FJC 
website.  As with most of the data discussed in this overview, caveats are needed.  In this 
context, information comes from court clerks, who use civil cover sheets and other materials 
prepared by lawyers and complete forms (JS5 and JS6) transmitted at least quarterly to the 
Administrative Office.  No independent methods of verifying uniformity or accuracy are 
undertaken centrally.  More caveats about the FJC Termination Data are detailed below. 
 67. Id.  To identify cases on class actions, we filtered the civil cases database for cases 
with a value of 1 in the “CLASSACT” field.  To obtain cases with pro se parties, we filtered 
the civil cases database for cases with a value of 1, 2, or 3 in the “PROSE” field. 
 68. Of the 450 unrepresented cases, 18 appeared to have both plaintiffs and defendants 
pro se; 334 had pro se plaintiffs, and 98 were defendant pro se cases.  The overlap of the 18 
cases brings the total to 352 terminated suits with pro se plaintiffs.  The causes of action 
were concentrated in just a handful of categories.  For the 352 cases with pro se plaintiffs, 
more than half were filed by prisoners, and more than half alleged civil rights violations.  
About one-fifth of those cases were employment cases, brought under the Age 
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were identified as class actions.69  Of these, we looked further into dockets 
and learned that at least 29 cases actually proceeded to trial as class actions; 
some concluded with bench or jury verdicts, while others ended with a 
settlement after some phase of trial had begun.70  Base rates are not yet 
knowable.  For example, public data do not track what cases are styled or 
certified as class actions. 
These data focus on lawyers in courts without trials.  But the ambitious 
questions of this colloquium—what ethics guide lawyers in twenty-first-
century dispute resolution—need also to take on administrative agency 
adjudication.  Efforts are underway to understand more about the 
adjudicatory work of administrative agencies, where tens of thousands of 
trial-like proceedings take place, and some proceed in the aggregate.71 
Returning to courthouses, as many have noted, judges do a good deal of 
adjudication without trials.  Researchers have looked for other metrics, 
including “bench presence,” tallying the hours judges spend in open court, 
whether on trial or not.  Researchers mined statistics gathered by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and reported a “steady year-over-
year decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 2012 that continued 
into 2013.  The results were that judges spent less than 2 hours a day on 
average in the courtroom, or about “423 hours of open court proceedings 
per active district judge.”72  Judges may well be involved and interact more 
 
Discrimination Employment Act, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, or the 
Performance Rating Act of 1950. Id. 
 69. Id.  The labeling did not always correspond to the individual cases tracked down 
thereafter.  Moreover, records are incomplete in some instances.  For example, an initial 
review identified fifty cases, but with subsequent analyses, we learned that forty-three class 
actions in FY 2015 appeared to have gone to trial. 
 70. In the FJC FY 2015 trial data set, another fourteen (0.5 percent) of the cases had a 
tag denoting that they were remanded from MDL proceedings. Id.  To obtain cases with 
recorded MDL docket numbers, we filtered the civil cases database for cases with some 
recorded MDL docket number in the “MDLDOCK” column. See INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM 
FOR PRACTICAL & SOC. RESEARCH, CODEBOOK FOR CIVIL TERMINATIONS DATA WITH DOCKET 
NUMBERS, PLT AND DEF CONTAINING ORIGINAL VALUES (2014) [hereinafter ICPSR, CIVIL 
CODEBOOK].  To obtain information about MDLs, we examined data released by the FJC on 
all civil cases. See Federal Court Cases:  Integrated Data Base, 2014 (ICPSR 36110), supra 
note 64.  For each case, a MDL docket number may be recorded. See ICPSR, CIVIL 
CODEBOOK, supra. 
 71. See Federal Administrative Adjudication, STAN. U.:  ADJUDICATION RES., https:// 
acus.law.stanford.edu/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/C9EW-XKGU].  The 
database defines adjudication as 
a decision by one or more federal officials made through an administrative process 
to resolve a claim or dispute arising out of a federal program between a private 
party and the government or two or more private parties based on a hearing—
either oral or written—in which one or more parties have an opportunity to 
introduce evidence or make arguments. 
Adjudication Research:  FAQ, STAN. U.:  ADJUDICATION RES., https://acus.law.stanford.edu/ 
content/user-guide (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/74QC-NQ4L]; see also 
Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing, supra note 1. 
 72. Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014:  An Updated Look at 
Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2014). 
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with litigants and lawyers in chambers, in forms of alternative dispute 
resolution, but these activities take place outside the public realm.73 
A final basic fact to bring into focus is the array of new rulemaking—the 
ACPR I referenced at the outset—which governs ADR.  Hundreds of local 
rules have been promulgated to govern ADR.  Yet those rules rarely 
address, let alone protect, the rights of the public to know much about either 
the processes or the results.  Privatization of process is the leitmotif.  
“Procedure as contract” was what I called this shift a decade ago, as courts 
promoted party-based agreement rather than dispute resolution in public 
courts.74  This change in norms and practices is at the center of the essay by 
Norman Spaulding, looking at how the culture of independent lawyers 
serving as an adversarial check is eroding.75  Whether such processes can 
provide fairness “beyond the adversary system,” as Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff puts it, is a question further explored below.76 
III.  EQUIPAGE, AGGREGATION, 
DISAGGREGATION, AND PRIVATIZATION 
Direct payment of lawyers, fee shifting from defendants to plaintiffs, and 
fee sharing through common benefit fund awards are methods of supporting 
access to courts and of regulating lawyers.  Aggregation of cases is another 
way to create economies of scale.  During the decades when federal dockets 
were growing, all these forms of subsidies were deployed; insurance and 
third-party financing were not much in focus. 
In 1974, Congress created the Legal Services Corporation77 (LSC) and, 
in 1976, enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act,78 authorizing 
fee shifting from losing defendants to victorious civil rights plaintiffs.  The 
1966 class action rule revisions provided new means to aggregate claims.79  
When these innovations were put together with fee shifting in other statutes 
(such as Title VII), new sets of plaintiffs made their way into the federal 
courts.  In 1980, new opportunities for fee shifting arose in litigation against 
the U.S. government; the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) waived 
sovereign immunity to impose federal government obligations to pay 
attorney’s fees to prevailing parties against the government in certain kinds 
of civil litigation.80 
 
 73. Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts:  Changing the Experiences 
and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV. L.J. 1631, 1636–37 (2015) 
[hereinafter Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts]. 
 74. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005); see 
also Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts, supra note 73.  
 75. Norman W. Spaulding, Due Process Without Judicial Process?:  Antiadversarialism 
in American Legal Culture, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2249 (2017). 
 76. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Fairness Beyond the Adversary System:  Procedural 
Justice Norms for Legal Negotiation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2017). 
 77. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378. 
 78. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)). 
 79. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 80. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)); see also Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the 
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Lawyers are the key figures in this colloquium, and hence more attention 
is needed to funding possibilities for litigants with no resources to hire 
lawyers directly.  In 1980, Congress appropriated $300 million to support 
the LSC.81  If such funding levels had remained, in real dollar terms, by 
2014, the LSC would have received $850 million.82  Congress has not 
matched funding and, in 2014, provided $365 million to the LSC.83  
Congress also saw—and limited—the key role played by what were known 
as backup centers, which had served as networks for coordination and 
communication on housing, welfare, and consumer law.84 
Moreover, in 1996, Congress barred legal services lawyers from 
initiating or participating in class actions.85  Again, the litany of 
prohibitions is familiar, as Congress imposed limits on forms of legislative 
advocacy, handling voter redistricting claims, initiating representation on 
behalf of prisoners, advocating that welfare laws were unconstitutional, or 
requesting attorney’s fees.86  Those regulations brought the question of 
lawyers’ ethics to the fore in 2001 when the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
aspects of the restrictions prohibiting advice on arguments related to 
welfare law or seeking to amend welfare law were impermissible under the 
First Amendment.87  Regulations also barred LSC lawyers from working on 
“adversarial” enforcement of final judgment and consent decrees.88 
Funding remains very limited.  According to the LSC, in 2014, more than 
sixty-three million Americans were eligible for its services,89 but LSC 
 
Equal Access to Justice Act:  Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable 
Government Conduct (pt. 1), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 220 (1994).  Parties are defined to include 
individuals whose net worth is less than $2 million, unincorporated business owners, 
partnerships, corporations, associations, units of local government, and organizations with a 
net worth that does not exceed $7 million. See id. at 297.  Tax-exempt organizations and 
cooperative agricultural organizations are not included in the net worth limitation.  
Organizations that employ more than 500 people are not eligible. See id. 
 81. 2013 LSC by the Numbers, LEGAL SERVICES CORP. (July 2014), http://www.lsc.gov/ 
media-center/publications/2013-lsc-numbers [https://perma.cc/S9ZT-FAJS]. 
 82. Memorandum from Lisa Wood, Chair, Am. Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal 
Aid & Indigent Def. to Legal Servs. Corp. 2 (June 2, 2014), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/LSC/pdfs/3.%20ABA-SCLAID%20FY2016%20Budget%20Rec%20%20to%20 
LSC.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX65-87PZ]. 
 83. Id.; see also Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 113-76, tit. IV, 128 Stat. 
5, 76 (2014). 
 84. See generally Lawrence J. Fox, Legal Services and the Organized Bar:  A 
Reminiscence and a Renewed Call for Cooperation, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 305 (1998). 
 85. Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–53; see also Judith Resnik & Emily Bazelon, Legal Services:  
Then and Now, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 292 (1998). 
 86. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act § 504(a), 110 Stat. at 
1321–52; Class Actions, 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2015).  
 87. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 537 (2001). 
 88. 45 C.F.R. §§ 1617.2–.3 (2016) (barring LSC recipients from initiating or 
participating in class actions); see also David S. Udell, The Legal Services Restrictions:  
Lawyers in Florida, New York, Virginia, and Oregon Describe the Costs, 17 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 337, 338 (1998) (describing the scope of the restrictions that the regulations 
place on LSC lawyers). 
 89.  These figures are keyed to federal poverty guidelines and permit aid to families of 
four that earn $30,000 or less. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2014), 
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lawyers could help only one in five of those eligible.90  And for those 
hoping that their cases will attract lawyers because of the potential to 
recoup fees from opponents, the Court’s narrowing interpretations of when 
success permits fee shifting can make that route riskier for lawyers.91 
Essays in this colloquium address the issue of lawyers working for causes 
and social movements.  Justin Hansford writes about the use of law “in 
Ferguson and Beyond,”92 and Scott Cummings addresses problems of 
accountability and efficacy.93  One measure of the pivotal role that lawyers 
play in various causes and social movements comes from congressional 
efforts to cut off lawyers from doing so.  The targeted efforts to 
disempower legal services lawyers were sketched above.  Congress also 
sought to limit lawyers representing prisoners.  The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act94 (PLRA), enacted in 1996, was animated by an effort to 
“STOP” (which was the acronym for an earlier version of the PLRA) the 
substantial successes that prisoners had achieved through conditions of 
confinement litigation.95  The PLRA has had its own success; as Margo 
Schlanger, who has analyzed prisoner litigation for several decades, 
documents, the statute has “undermined prisoners’ ability to bring, settle, 
and win lawsuits.”96 
 
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/LSC2014AnnualReport.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5Q9L-XCVV]; see also The Future of Legal Services:  The Arthur Liman 
Colloquium Papers, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 283 (1998). 
 90.  FY 2016 Budget Request, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/media-
center/publications/fy-2016-budget-request#bfrtoc-afy-2016-budget-requests (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/WR53-67VK]. 
 91.  See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001); see also Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 600–04 (2010) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing the adverse consequences of the Court’s holding on 
attorneys who are unable to obtain fees under the EAJA due to a Government offset to 
satisfy the prevailing litigant’s preexisting debt).  Fee-shifting statutes can have distinctive 
tests to determine when litigants can recoup. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (clarifying the “exceptional” case standard for fee 
shifting in patent cases under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012)); Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins., 
560 U.S. 242, 245 (2010) (holding that a litigant must obtain “some degree of success on the 
merits” for the litigant’s attorney to recover fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1), the fee-
shifting provision for most ERISA actions (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 
680, 694 (1983))). 
 92. Justin Hansford, Demosprudence on Trial:  Ethics for Movement Lawyers, in 
Ferguson and Beyond, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2057 (2017). 
 93. Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking the Foundational Critiques of Lawyers in Social 
Movements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (2017). 
 94. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626 and 28 U.S.C. § 1932). 
 95. Overhauling the Nation’s Prisons:  Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 
(July 27, 1995), 1995 WL 449222 (testimony of Steve J. Martin, General Counsel for the 
Texas Department of Correction). 
 96. Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 153 (2015) [hereinafter Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation]; 
see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time:  A Case Study of Jail and 
Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) [hereinafter Schlanger, Civil Rights 
Injunctions over Time]; Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003) 
[hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation]. 
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The PLRA imposed a requirement that prisoners use difficult 
administrative grievance procedures and pay special filing fees; further, 
Congress created new work for lawyers representing prisoners, while 
lowering their potential attorney’s fees if successful.97  Congress authorized 
defendants and intervenors to move to terminate injunctive relief (including 
long-standing consent decrees) and directed courts to do so, absent new 
fact-finding identifying ongoing constitutional violations that could only be 
redressed through narrowly drawn remedies.98 
Veronica Root has focused her contribution to the colloquium on 
monitors in litigation seeking economic redress.99  Monitors have likewise 
been central in overseeing implementation of structural injunctions in 
prisons,100 and the PLRA imposed new constraints on their use by layering 
additional statutory requirements on top of what Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 53 provides.101  In her 2015 update on the impact of the PLRA, 
Schlanger concluded that the PLRA had also “succeeded in radically 
shrinking—but not eliminating—the coverage” of injunctive orders,102 in 
part by limiting the “life span of new orders.”103  She mapped the decline 
from 1983 to 2006 in the percentage of jails (from 18 percent to 11 percent) 
and of prisons (from 27 percent to 18 percent) subjected to court orders and 
the rarity of statewide court orders in the twenty-first century.104 
Prisoners and other poor people are part of a larger group of individuals 
whose ability to proceed collectively has been limited.  In the early 1970s, 
in its first major interpretation of the 1966 class action rule in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin,105 the Supreme Court insisted that under the then-
recently amended Rule 23, plaintiffs provide and pay for notice to 
individual class members.106  That requirement priced subsets of lawyers 
out of the class action market. 
 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3) (limiting attorney’s fees to “an hourly rate [equal to or less] 
than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under section 3006A of title 18 [of the United 
States Code] for payment of court-appointed counsel” and setting other limitations based on 
reasonableness of fees). 
 98. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A) (“In any civil action with respect to prison conditions 
in which prospective relief is ordered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any 
party or intervener.”); id. § 3626(a)(2) (“Preliminary injunctive relief shall automatically 
expire on the date that is 90 days after its entry, unless the court makes the findings required 
under subsection (a)(1) for the entry of prospective relief . . . .”). 
 99. See Veronica Root, Constraining Monitors, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2227 (2017). 
 100. See generally Vincent M. Nathan, Taking Stock of the Accomplishments and 
Failures of Prison Reform Litigation:  Have the Courts Made a Difference in the Quality of 
Prison Conditions?:  What Have We Accomplished to Date?, 24 PACE L. REV. 419 (2004); 
Note, “Mastering” Intervention in Prisons, 88 YALE L.J. 1062 (1979). 
 101. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 53, with 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f). 
 102. Schlanger, Trends in Prison Litigation, supra note 96, at 155. 
 103. Id. at 168. 
 104. Id. at 169 tbl.8. 
 105. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
 106. The ruling was seen as profoundly undermining Rule 23. See Kenneth W. Dam, 
Class Action Notice:  Who Needs It?, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 98–99. 
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Another focus of Congress was securities litigation.  In 1995, Congress 
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act107 (PSLRA), which 
imposed new requirements atop those in Rule 23 for that subset of cases.  
Before seeking class certification, “the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall cause to 
be published, in a widely circulated national business-oriented publication 
or wire service, a notice advising members of the purported plaintiff 
class.”108  This intervention altered the market for legal services, as it 
slowed down certification by requiring judges to decide which clients and 
their lawyers would gain leadership status as the “most adequate 
plaintiff.”109  Further, Congress sought to tie fee awards to client 
recoupment, by calling for fees to be based on the amount “actually paid to” 
the class, as contrasted with the value of the total fund established to be 
distributed.110 
In the last few years, the Supreme Court has returned repeatedly to class 
actions,111 often imposing new obstacles, albeit varying with the kind of 
class action and by the stage of class action proceedings.  Lawyers were at 
the center of concerns recounted in the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor112 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,113 
which rejected large-scale mass tort class settlements.  In 2011, the Court 
made certification of class actions in the employment context more 
expensive through imposing exacting commonality requirements.114  Yet, 
other arenas of activity prove that class actions retain their vitality, with 
examples ranging from environmental harms (the BP oil spill and VW 
emissions) to prison conditions and solitary confinement.  Further, as 
sketched above and is increasingly discussed, multidistrict litigation has 
become a home for mass torts.115 
However, the Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
has taken whole sets of potential claimants out of the courts and out of the 
marketplace of lawyers.  Many articles have detailed the recent expansive 
interpretations of the 1925 congressional legislation now known as the 
 
 107. Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(b), 109 Stat. 737, 743–49 (1995). 
 108. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i) (2012). 
 109. See id. § 77z-1(a)(3)(A); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (“[T]he court shall consider any 
motion made by a purported class member . . . and shall appoint as lead plaintiff the member 
or members of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to be most capable of 
adequately representing the interests of class members . . . .”); see also id. § 77z-
1(a)(3)(B)(i); id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v) (“The most adequate plaintiff shall, subject to the 
approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.”). 
 110. Id. § 78u-4(a)(6) (“Total attorneys’ fees and expenses awarded by the court to 
counsel for the plaintiff class shall not exceed a reasonable percentage of the amount of any 
damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the class.”); see also Lynn A. Baker, 
Michael A. Perino & Charles Silver, Is the Price Right?:  An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting 
in Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1371 (2015). 
 111. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation 
Reform:  An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014). 
 112. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 113. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 114. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 349–50. 
 115. See Resnik, From “Cases to “Litigation,” supra note 42, at 19–22. 
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FAA.116  The Supreme Court has insisted that both state and federal courts 
enforce a myriad of arbitration provisions (promulgated by issuers of 
consumer credit, manufacturers of products, and employers) that preclude 
aggregation before any dispute has arisen.117 
In “Diffusing Disputes,” I discussed research seeking to understand 
whether the mass production of arbitration clauses (requiring claimants 
alleging violations of federal and state statutory and common law wrongs to 
proceed single file to decision makers designated by the clauses’ providers) 
have produced a mass of arbitration.118  But as I document there, empirical 
research has identified very few actual filings of individual arbitrations, as 
contrasted with the numbers of customers or employees subjected to those 
clauses.  Rather than providing more paths for claimants, the provisions 
function to cut off users, thereby erasing as well as diffusing disputes.119 
Lawyers are central in these developments, both as drafters of the clauses 
and as targets of potential defendants seeking to end the fee incentives 
available to lawyers if representing individuals in aggregates.  To 
understand the ways in which court access is denied requires looking at the 
forms that cut off that forum, as well as at the case law interpreting their 
importance.  As Victor D. Quintanilla and Alexander B. Avtgis discuss in 
this colloquium, data suggest that the public views these provisions 
negatively.120  But even if public approval is lacking and the forms are not 
readily understood, people seeking jobs or buying products cannot negotiate 
the terms. 
Because those provisions are buried in individual application forms or in 
the fine print of consumer documents, I believe it is important to publish 
and republish them, particularly here in an issue devoted to the work and 
ethics of lawyers.121  Even though the graphics provided below are dense 
and hard to read, these are the real forms replete with tiny print and 
presented to individuals and to courts.  Figure 11 is the two-page 
“Application for Employment” that Waffle House (“America’s Place to 
Work, America’s Place to Eat”) required prospective employees to sign.122  
The document comes from the record in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,123 
decided by the Supreme Court in 2002.124  To clarify what is written, let me 
explain that in the hand-marked portions, Eric Scott Baker reported that he 
 
 116. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2808. 
 117. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 361 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  These developments are detailed in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 
2889–93, Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 53, at 118–33, and J. Maria Glover, 
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3061 (2015). 
 118. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2893–914. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Victor D. Quintanilla & Alexander B. Avtgis, The Public Believes Predispute 
Binding Arbitration Clauses Are Unjust:  Ethical Implications for Dispute-System Design in 
the Time of Vanishing Trials, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2119 (2017). 
 121. See, e.g., Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2866 fig.6. 
 122. This figure also appears in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2866 fig.6. 
 123. 534 U.S. 279 (2002). 
 124. Joint Appendix, Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (No. 99-1823), 2001 WL 
34093975, at *59, *61. 
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was able to start work in two weeks, that he had a diploma from high 
school, and the kind of car that he drove. 
 
Figure 11:  Waffle House Employment Application 
 
1928 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
The printed terms that were imposed by Waffle House were generic, not 
personal.  The form told all applicants that, were they to be employed, 
Waffle House could 
deduct from any monies due [them], an amount to cover any shortages 
which may occur and that they had to indemnify the company against any 
legal liability for withholding wages.  Moreover, if money, food, or 
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equipment to which he had access was alleged to be lost, applicants had 
“to submit to a polygraph” or other testing.125 
Below, I quote from the terms on dispute resolution set forth in microprint: 
The parties agree that any dispute or claim concerning Applicant’s 
employment with Waffle House, Inc., or any subsidiary or Franchisee of 
Waffle House, Inc., or the terms, conditions or benefits of such 
employment, including whether such dispute or claim is arbitrable, will be 
settled by binding arbitration.  The arbitration proceedings shall be 
conducted under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association in effect at the time a demand for arbitration is 
made.  A decision and award of the arbitrator made under the said rules 
shall be exclusive, final and binding on both parties, their heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors and assigns. The costs and expenses of the 
arbitration shall be borne evenly by the parties.126 
What we know from the several decisions by federal judges is that Eric 
Baker signed the application on June 23, 1994, at a Waffle House in 
Columbia, South Carolina.  Some weeks later, he was hired at another 
Waffle House miles away.  Soon thereafter, Baker had a seizure (that the 
courts described as lasting “approximately thirty seconds”) at work.  After 
he lost his job in early September of 1994, Baker complained to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Waffle House had 
violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA).  After the EEOC filed an enforcement action in federal district 
court, Waffle House sought to dismiss the case and to compel the EEOC to 
go to arbitration.127 
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens held that the form did 
not impose a limit on a filing by the EEOC, which was authorized by 
Congress to “vindicate the public interest” as well as to seek victim-specific 
remedies.128  The effects of this ruling underscore the relevance of lawyers 
to the capacity to pursue claims.  Twenty-eight state attorneys general had 
argued to the Court that the EEOC should be able to proceed, as should they 
in enforcing state statutes.129  Since the decision, state and federal officials 
have brought discrimination cases, and states have successfully rebuffed 
defendants’ arguments that the forms preclude their doing so.130 
But for ordinary people, such forms mostly keep them out of court.  
Despite the Court’s characterization of the employment applications and 
consumer documents as “contracts,” these “pieces of paper” deserve no 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:96-2739-O, 1998 WL 35168489, at *1 
(D.S.C. Mar. 23, 1998). 
 128. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. at 290, 296–98. 
 129. See Brief for the States of Missouri et al. Supporting Petitioner, Waffle House, Inc., 
534 U.S. 279 (No. 99-1823), 2001 WL 34131148. 
 130. See Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 843 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 
2014); Joulé, Inc. v. Simmons, 944 N.E.2d 143 (Mass. 2011); People v. Coventry First LLC, 
915 N.E.2d 616 (N.Y. 2009). 
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such stature.  As explained long ago by Arthur Leff, the definition of a 
contract was “not only a deal, but dealing.”131  Through real negotiations—
even on form provisions—“the possibility of monolithic one-sidedness” 
was reduced.132  In contrast, the form that was signed by Eric Baker was 
one of many “products of non-bargaining”; as such, these were what Leff 
termed “unilaterally manufactured commodities.”133  As what Leff called a 
“thing,” the law ought to regulate its quality as it did other products. 
But, instead of limiting arbitration to negotiated contracts, the Court 
licensed expansive use of that product by applying the FAA to litigants 
claiming violations of the Credit Repair Organization Act in 2012 and to a 
family restaurant, Italian Colors, which argued that the American Express 
Company had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act in 2013.134  Pending 
before the Court as I write is the applicability of the FAA to the National 
Labor Relations Act, which provides for collective action.135 
As has become familiar, the Supreme Court decided the question of the 
enforceability of class action bans in 2011.  In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion,136 a five-person majority of the Court held that the 1925 
FAA’s authorization to enforce arbitration clauses permitted providers of 
those clauses to impose such bans. 
Here again, lawyers and markets are key drivers of the litigation 
landscape.  The Supreme Court addressed “class arbitration” in 2003 in 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,137  in which the Court held that the 
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Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 605, 614 (1985). 
 135. In January of 2017, the Court granted certiorari in three consolidated cases. Morris v. 
Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-300, 2017 WL 
125665 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. 
granted, No. 16-285, 2017 WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 2017 WL 125666 (U.S. 
Jan. 13, 2017).  The question, as phrased in the certiorari petition, in Morris is “[w]hether the 
collective-bargaining provisions of the National Labor Relations Act prohibit the 
enforcement under the FAA of an agreement requiring an employee to arbitrate claims 
against an employer on an individual, rather than collective, basis.” Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Morris, 834 F.3d 975 (No. 16-300).  In addition, the Court has on its 2016–2017 
docket Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2015), cert. granted sub 
nom. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016).  At issue is “[w]hether the 
FAA pre-empts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration by requiring a power of 
attorney to expressly refer to arbitration agreements before the attorney-in-fact can bind her 
principal to an arbitration agreement.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kindred Nursing Ctrs. 
Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 368 (No. 16-32). 
 136. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 137. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
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question of whether a contract precluded class arbitration was to be 
determined initially by an arbitrator rather than a judge.138  In response, 
arbitration providers offered rules for class arbitrations by incorporating 
aspects of the federal class action rule.139  A database maintained by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) detailed more than 280 such 
actions listed by 2009. 
Yet potential defendants sought to deflect the practice by drafting clauses 
prohibiting class arbitrations.140  Some included symmetrical preclusions 
(illustrated in figure 12), with terms such as “YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT 
TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR 
CLAIM AGAINST US . . . AND WE WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE 
ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM 
AGAINST YOU.”141  These clauses usually included an “anti-severability 
provision,” stipulating that if a court found the clause unenforceable, the 
obligation to arbitrate would become unavailable and all claims had to be 
brought to court.142 
 
 
 138. Id. at 452–53. 
 139. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS 
ARBITRATIONS (2003), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTA 
GE2048284&revision=latestreleased [https://perma.cc/G9YM-2WXH].  A very helpful 
overview comes from Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide 
Arbitration:  Arbitral Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301, 303 n.20 
(2004).  These issues are also discussed in Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 53, at 
122–23.  Looking to more recent data from the AAA, some class arbitrations continue to be 
filed. See Class Arbitration Case Docket, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/ 
services/disputeresolutionservices/casedocket (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (searching for 
class arbitrations on the AAA’s Class Arbitration Docket yields nineteen class arbitration 
proceedings in 2016) [https://perma.cc/K6E7-DBNK]. 
 140. See Brief of CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
at 17–18, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 
709799, at *17–18. 
 141. That provision in figure 12, which comes from a wireless cellular phone document 
from AT&T on file with the author, was not sui generis. See, e.g., Prepay Wireless Service 
Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS (2000), http://www.verizonwireless.com/privacy 
_disclosures/prepay_wireless_svc.html (“EVEN IF APPLICABLE LAW PERMITS CLASS 
ACTIONS OR CLASS ARBITRATIONS, YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A 
CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM AGAINST US . . . AND WE 
WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO PURSUE ON A CLASS BASIS ANY SUCH CONTROVERSY 
OR CLAIM AGAINST YOU.”) [http://perma.cc/X3L6-8PPC]. 
  The self-obliged symmetrical limitation aims to avoid questions about the 
enforceability of the provisions. See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 
379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that state law may find unconscionable an agreement 
requiring consumers to arbitrate their claims but which permits the provider to choose 
between arbitration and litigation).  Whether symmetrical constraints are required is an open 
question. See, e.g., THI of N.M at Hobbs Ctr., LLC, v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th 
Cir. 2014); Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow, 2014 Ark. 375, at 3, 2014 WL 4656609, at *2. 
 142. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:  REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), 
at 45–46 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY], http:// 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LHZ8-L8B5]. 
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Figure 12:  Document Accompanying 
the Purchase of a Cellular Phone, 2002 
 
The AT&T litigation became the first time the Court addressed the 
lawfulness of preventing individuals from joining together in arbitration.  
Vincent and Liza Concepcion filed “on behalf of all consumers who entered 
into a transaction in California wherein they received a cell phone for free 
or at a discount . . . but were charged sales tax” in excess of that “payable 
[as] calculated on the actual discounted price.”143  The Concepcions, 
 
 143. Complaint at 5, Concepcion v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 06CV 0675 DMS NLS 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2006), 2006 WL 1194855. 
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overcharged $30.22, alleged that the providers had violated California’s 
consumer protection laws against deceptive and false advertising.144 
California law was clear on the question of the potential for group-based 
procedures, for the state had both a statute and a decision145 governing the 
issue.  Under California law, when class waivers were in a “consumer 
contract of adhesion,” predictably small damage disputes could arise 
between the parties,146 and the “party with the superior bargaining power” 
was alleged to have “carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large 
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money,” a waiver 
would be unenforceable because it functioned to exempt the party from 
responsibility for the allegedly willful injury inflicted.147 
The U.S. Supreme Court held, however, that the FAA preempted 
California’s rule, which stood as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”148  The AT&T 
Court rested its holding on “our cases,”149 which ascribed two 
rationales to the FAA:  “judicial enforcement of privately made agreements 
to arbitrate”150 and elimination of the “costliness and delays of 
litigation.”151 
As many articles have since detailed, the numbers of clauses mandating 
arbitration have since soared in many sectors.  A 1991 survey identified 
fewer than 4 percent of firms requiring arbitration in employment; by 2007, 
another study found that more than 45 percent of firms did so.152  In 2008, 
the estimate was that “a quarter or more of all non-union employees in the 
United States”—thirty million employees—were covered.153 
As I and others have also discussed, tens of millions of consumers are 
obliged to use arbitration.  For example, virtually all providers of wireless 
services insist on mandatory arbitration, along with the option of using 
small claims court for individual actions.154  Further, according to a 2015 
study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), approximately 
 
 144.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1760 (West 2017). 
 145.  Id. § 1668; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
 146. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110. 
 147. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668. 
 148. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 149. Id. at 345 n.5. 
 150. Id. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).  I 
analyze this case in depth in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2889–93. 
 151. AT&T, 563 U.S. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 470 U.S. at 220). 
 152. See Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum:  An Empirical 
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 95–96 (2014). 
 153. Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration 
in the United States:  Actors and Outcomes, 68 ILR REV. 1019, 1020 (2015). 
 154. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 26, 33–34.  To clarify, 
“[t]he CFPB review concluded that 87.5% of the major wireless providers (servicing over 
99.9% of subscribers to these providers) have arbitration obligations, and 85% (servicing 
over 99.7% of arbitration-subject subscribers) also permit use of small claims court.” Id. 
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fifty percent of credit card loans are subject to arbitration,155 and nearly all 
that were studied “expressly did not allow arbitration to proceed on a class 
basis.”156 
That the purpose of arbitration clauses is to disable collective actions 
rather than to enable more access to bringing claims can be seen first by 
way of a brief discussion of a 2015 Supreme Court decision and by the data 
we gathered relating to individual claims against AT&T over a five-year 
period.  DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia157 is an odd case that on many metrics 
would seem to merit relatively little judicial attention.  At issue was a 
clause written in 2007 in a service agreement that provided that “if the law 
of your state” made a waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, the 
obligation to arbitrate was likewise unenforceable.158  Amy Imburgia and 
Kathy Greiner had sued DIRECTV and complained that DIRECTV violated 
California law by imposing early cancellation penalties “often as high as 
$480” and did so “directly from the customers’ bank accounts or credit 
cards, using account information provided by the customers when they first 
ordered DIRECTV, without consulting them or otherwise obtaining their 
consent.”159 
The plaintiffs claimed that the “early termination fees” bore “no relation 
to the damage, if any, incurred by DIRECTV in connection with an early 
termination of the service.”160  Rather, DIRECTV used the penalty “to 
force customers to pay for its services for at least 18 months (and 
sometimes longer) and prevent customers from readily changing to another 
satellite or cable provider, even if they are no longer able to use 
DIRECTV’s service due to faulty equipment or other reasons.”161 
The plaintiff class sought injunctive relief “on behalf of all current and 
former DIRECTV customers who were charged or may be charged an early 
cancellation penalty and monetary relief on behalf of current and former 
DIRECTV customers who paid DIRECTV an early cancellation 
penalty.”162  The proposed class action alleged that DIRECTV had violated 
the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act by “[f]ailing to disclose” 
adequately the terms and the method of collecting the cancellation fees, by 
including “unconscionable and unenforceable terms,” and by collecting 
fees.163  The proposed class action also alleged that DIRECTV had violated 
California’s false advertising law with misleading advertising.164  Remedies 
 
 155. See id. at 9, 10 fig.1, 31. 
 156. See id. at 44–45.  That study concluded that no issuers of credit cards had dropped 
arbitration clauses over the period studied; a few added such provisions. See id. at 11–12. 
 157. 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015). 
 158. Id. at 466. 
 159. Class Action Complaint at 1, Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. BC398295, 2008 WL 
4264463 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2008). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.; see also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770(a)(9), (a)(14), (a)(19) (West 2017). 
 164. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2017).  The proposed class also alleged that 
DIRECTV violated other provisions of California law, including a section in its Business 
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ranged from declaratory relief to “restitution, disgorgement, actual, 
statutory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs, including 
pre-judgment and post-judgment interest,”165 as well as injunctive relief, 
and the complaint sought “constructive trusts on all monies by which 
DIRECTV was unjustly enriched as a result of collecting the early 
cancellation penalties” and other remedies under California statutory and 
common law, including “without limitation, restitution.”166 
At that time, the law of California rendered the class action waiver 
unenforceable.167  That changed in 2011, when the Supreme Court decided 
AT&T.  An intermediate California appellate court interpreted the clause 
that DIRECTV’s lawyers had drafted and held that because it specifically 
called for the application of California law, the obligation to arbitrate was 
not enforceable.168  In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  The 
majority decision by Justice Breyer insisted that under the Court’s 
approach, arbitration was obligatory.169  The dissent, by Justice Ginsburg 
(joined by Justice Sotomayor), argued that courts were to “give the 
customer, not the drafter, the benefit of the doubt” and hence provide 
“effective access to justice,”170 while Justice Thomas viewed the FAA as 
not applicable to the transaction.171 
DIRECTV is a lawsuit made from lawyers’ drafting of arbitration clauses.  
But, unlike the class action waiver at issue in AT&T that affected millions 
of people and unlike the provisions in hundreds of documents related to 
consumer goods and employment, the DIRECTV dispute related only to 
older claims under clauses that lawyers, working for those imposing 
arbitration, should no longer use. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent explained that 
under the Court’s prior cases, the federal statute could itself be 
“preempted . . . by parties’ intent,” when set forth in contracts.172  That 
approach can be found in the 2008 decision in Hall Street Associates v. 
Mattel, Inc.,173 discussing that parties could choose the governing law to 
apply.  But in DIRECTV, the majority rejected what the contract drafters 
 
and Professions Code prohibiting any “fraudulent . . . business act or practice” and its 
common law prohibition on unjust enrichment. 
 165. Class Action Complaint at 22, Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., No. BC398295, 2012 
WL 7657788 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2012), 2008 WL 4264463. 
 166. Id. at 2. 
 167. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 
2005). 
 168. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190 (Ct. App. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. 
Ct. 463 (2015). 
 169. See DIRECTV, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 471. 
 170. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 171. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 473 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 173. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).  In her dissent in DIRECTV, Justice Ginsburg quoted Hall 
Street; as she understood the FAA, parties could “tailor some, even many, features of 
arbitration by contract, including . . . procedure and choice of . . . law.” DIRECTV, Inc., 136 
S. Ct. at 473.  Playing off the language in the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg also noted 
that parties could even “choose to have portions of their contract governed by the law of 
Tibet, the law of pre-revolutionary Russia.” Id. at 468. 
1936 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
had detailed, which was to vitiate the arbitration mandate and permit a class 
action in court. 
Proponents of arbitration argue its utility in part by claiming it creates 
more access to bringing claims.  Thus, just as a discussion of trials pivots 
around their increasing infrequency, a discussion of arbitration also requires 
inquiries into data about their use.  As I detail elsewhere and sketch here, 
little evidence supports the position of arbitration enthusiasts that it expands 
the use of dispute resolution in a speedy and effective way.  In fact, the 
mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted in a mass of 
arbitrations.174 
I provide two examples below, first from arbitrations involving wireless 
service providers and then from data from the CFPB.  I chose to focus on 
claims against AT&T Mobility because that was the company involved in 
the decision approving the ban on class arbitrations.175  As detailed in 
“Diffusing Disputes,” under California law, providers of arbitration services 
to consumers have to archive results in five-year intervals.176 
The AAA has been designated by AT&T and has complied with state 
reporting mandates.  By looking at five years of reporting, we identified 
134 individual claims (about 27 a year) filed against AT&T between 2009 
and 2014.177  During that time period, the estimated number of AT&T 
wireless customers rose from 85 million to 120 million people, and lawsuits 
filed by the federal government charged the company with a range of legal 
breaches, including systematic overcharging for extra services and 
insufficient payments of refunds when customers complained.178  More 
generally, the AAA, which is the largest nonprofit provider of arbitration 
services in the United States, averages under 1,500 consumer arbitrations 
annually;179 its full docket includes 150,000 to 200,000 filings a year.180  
 
 174. See David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 459, 463 (2014). 
 175. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352–53 (2011). 
 176. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2812–14.  Specifically, we reviewed 
the file documenting arbitrations from July of 2009 through June (the second quarter) of 
2014 by filtering claims against AT&T. Id. at 2812 n.25.  We then removed all claims filed 
by one firm after learning that it had filed the 1,149 claims in an effort to create de facto 
class actions.  Thus, we identified 134 individual claims. Id.  Thereafter, we sent summaries 
and drafts of our analyses to AAA’s Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research, 
Ryan Boyle, who was very helpful in providing materials and explanations. 
 177. See Consumer Arbitration Statistics:  Provider Organization Report, AM. ARB. 
ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer/consumerarbstat (last visited Mar. 
25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/UPX6-FVWG]. 
 178. See Number of AT&T Wireless Subscribers from 2007 to 2014 (in 1,000s), STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/220692/number-of-atundt-wireless-subscribers-since-2007 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [http://perma.cc/PU6N-FTP4]; 4Q 2014 AT&T by the Numbers, 
AT&T (Dec. 20, 2016), http://about.att.com/content/csr/home/assets/4q2014-by-the-
numbers.html [https://perma.cc/H9XB-447E]; see also Complaint for Permanent Injunction 
and Other Equitable Relief at 3–4, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227-HLM 
(N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014); Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment 
at 16, AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227-HLM. 
 179. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2908 fig.7 (noting that the AAA 
only recorded 7,303 claims labeled consumer arbitrations, excluding construction, real 
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Thus, were arbitration providers to be in high demand, their capacity to 
respond would be limited. 
My second example comes from the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, which looked at six credit-related markets for which, again, the 
AAA is the predominant provider of arbitration services.181  The CFPB’s 
“2013 Preliminary Results” reported millions of consumers subject to 
arbitration and found an average of 415 individual AAA filings per year 
from 2010 to 2012 in four consumer product markets—credit cards, 
checking accounts, payday loans, and prepaid cards.  In its 2015 report, the 
CFPB added two products, private student loans and auto loans, to its 
analysis—bringing the three years’ annual average up to 616.182  In the 
figure below,183 we summarize the findings that about two-thirds of the 
filings were by consumers, while the remaining filings included disputes 
brought by both parties as well as those by companies. 
  
 
estate, other industry and employment categories); Analysis of the American Arbitration 
Association’s Consumer Arbitration Caseload:  Based on Consumer Cases Awarded 
Between January and August 2007, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/ 
ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004325 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LPG6-
S6F9]. 
 180. Statement of Ethical Principles for the American Arbitration Association, an ADR 
Provider Organization, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about/mission/ 
ethicalprinciples (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) (describing the AAA as administering 
“approximately 150,000 cases” each year) [http://perma.cc/Z4QY-9TNX]. 
 181. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 10, 34–35.  That study in 
turn relied on AAA data and described the AAA as the provider in 83 percent of credit card 
arbitration clauses and in 86 percent of the surveyed mobile wireless arbitration clauses. 
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2853 n.238 (citing CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION 
STUDY, supra note 142, at 36–39 tbls.4 & 5). 
 182. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 11. 
 183. Data are from AAA Data, July 2009–June 2014, Provider Organization Report (on 
file with the Fordham Law Review), and CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142 at 
11.  This figures also appears in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2908 fig.7. 
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Figure 13:  Consumer Arbitrations Filed 
with the American Arbitration Association, 2009–2014 
 
Sources Types Estimated 
Number of 
Consumers 
Average 
per Year 
Total 
AAA Data, 
Provider 
Organization 
Report 
June 2009– 
July 2014 
AAA-defined 
consumer 
claims 
85–120 
million 
consumers 
1,460 7,303 
AAA claims 
involving 
AT&T 
27 134* 
Consumer 
Financial 
Protection 
Bureau, 2015 
Arbitration 
Study 
January 
2010–
December 
2012 
AAA claims in 
credit card, 
prepaid card, 
checking 
account, 
payday, private 
student, and 
auto loan 
markets 
80 million 
credit-card 
consumers 
616** 1,847 
* All 134 of the consumer claims involving AT&T were filed by consumers. 
** Of the 616 consumer arbitrations a year, approximately two-thirds were filed 
by consumers. 
IV.  THE ETHICS OF LAWYERING IN DISPUTE DIFFUSION 
I have sought to frame the questions of lawyers’ ethics by starting not 
from lawyers and their work but from the world of dispute resolution in 
which transactional, litigating, and problem-solving lawyers pursue their 
profession.  A brief summary of the picture of change that I have sketched 
is in order, as is a discussion of its implications for the ethics and ethos of 
lawyers and for the regulation of both lawyers and judges. 
First, some 45 to 50 million cases (holding aside juvenile and traffic 
proceedings) are filed annually in state courts; in contrast, very few people 
make their way into federal court.  A significant percentage of plaintiffs 
who do file proceed without lawyers.  Many are lawyerless because they 
cannot afford to pay attorney’s fees.184 
Second, the shift away from a court-centric process imposes challenges 
for claimants and respondents seeking to understand the contours and the 
methods of newly developed systems.  Simply put, finding the ACPR is 
hard, as is getting data on the processes and results.  Courts today are 
 
 184. See Ian Weinstein, Access to Civil Justice in America:  What Do We Know?, in 
BEYOND ELITE LAW, supra note 59, at 3, 3–4. 
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creating a host of user-friendly materials, such as self-help kiosks, 
assistance from clerks’ offices, and many forms accessible on the web.  
Parallels cannot be found in the diffuse ADR world.  My students and I 
have poured over a sea of arbitration clauses and governing rules to try to 
figure out which kinds of rules (“consumer,” “commercial,” or “wireless”) 
apply to which transactions.  Accessible forms on fee waivers and 
consumer-friendly guides were difficult to locate. 
Third, the new systems being built do not attend to poor people and the 
need for lawyers.  As I have noted when analyzing rules of the AAA, some 
providers—by choice and as a result of their own views of their own 
ethics—limit the costs to be imposed on consumers in the arbitrations for 
which it is the designated provider.185  In 2013, the AAA instituted a $200 
filing fee for consumers and continued applying that fee in its 2014 
consumer rule revisions.186  A few state statutes in turn impose regulations. 
In 2002, as part of its packet of arbitration regulations, California required 
fee waivers for “indigent consumers,” defined as those with incomes of less 
than “300 percent of the federal poverty guidelines.”  California instructed 
providers to give consumers notice of this option and to create forms for 
sworn declarations that a particular consumer qualified; providers were not 
to ask for additional information.187 
The AAA has complied with a form labeled “Waiver of Fees Notice for 
Use by California Consumers Only,”188 which is available on the web.  
Another document is available for the rest of the country, entitled an 
“Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative 
Fees.”189  That affidavit requires consumers outside of California to make 
 
 185. See NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL:  STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 17 (1998), 
https://adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_005014 [https://perma.cc/2BPE-ZTZV]; 
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 2, at 2912 n.529 (citing CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION 
STUDY, supra note 142, at 57–64).  “Moreover, ‘[s]ignificant shares of arbitration clauses 
across almost all markets . . . did not address attorneys’ fees.’” Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 66).  “Some clauses provided 
that attorneys’ fees were to be awarded to prevailing consumers.” Id. (citing CFPB 2015 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 142, at 67–68). 
 186. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 34 (2014), 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021425&revision=late
streleased [https://perma.cc/7Z9H-WJD3]; AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED 
DISPUTES:  SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES 14 (2013), https://www.adr.org/aaa/Show 
Property?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2009997&revision=latestreleased [https://perma.cc/ 
MKS2-D4RF]. 
 187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1)–(2) (West 2017). 
 188. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Affidavit for Waiver 
of Fees Notice for Use by California Consumers Only (2011), http://www.adr.org/aaa/ 
ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004304 [http://perma.cc/3GB4-PFUX]; see also Search Forms, 
AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/fileacase/forms (last visited Mar. 25, 
2017) (including fifty-eight other forms as well as the fee waiver hardship form for 
California consumers) [http://perma.cc/6RR6-YSRZ]. 
 189. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, American Arbitration Association Affidavit in Support of 
Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative Fees (on file with the Fordham Law 
Review).  Thanks to AAA staff for directing me to it.  On the web, the AAA indicates under 
the heading “Administrative Fee Waivers and Pro Bono Arbitrators” that “parties are eligible 
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detailed disclosures of assets, income, and liabilities and does not indicate 
the availability of full waivers.  Notably, the AAA reports that it has given 
waivers when requests are made190 but that it does not track the numbers or 
kinds of waivers, deductions, or deferrals given.191  Holding California 
aside, publicly accessible analogues to court-based “in forma pauperis” fee 
waivers are not available in arbitration.192 
Fourth, the problem of learning about the use of arbitration is mirrored by 
the problems of learning about the use of ADR in general.  To the extent 
public records exist, individual consumer arbitrations are rare.  Most state 
and federal courts do not require data collection on other forms of ADR 
used under their aegis.  In contrast, as my opening charts reflect, federal and 
state courts regularly publish data on filed cases. 
Fifth, aside from the arbitration mandates, when lawyers can work in 
courts, many are functioning as parts of aggregated cases of various forms.  
For example, reliance on MDLs has grown, enabling cost sharing 
characterized by cross-plaintiff subsidies providing an infusion of resources 
for individual litigants and their lawyers.  Those arrangements result in a 
host of dispositions, many of which provide comprehensive resolutions.  
The utilities of doing so are debated, but even with hostility to class actions, 
market pressures have and will continue to produce lawyers and judges and 
private dispute resolvers bundling parties and claims.  And like ADR and 
mandated arbitration, much of the decision making goes unseen and 
relatively unregulated. 
As a consequence, the vitality of courts, both state and federal, has been 
put into question, as has the relevance of constitutional doctrine calling for 
“open courts” and “rights to remedies.”  The public is excluded in most 
pretrial and ADR processes based in courts, has a hard time finding agency-
based adjudication, and is generally precluded from attending the 
arbitrations mandated by federal law.  Professionals (be they judges, 
lawyers, or other dispute resolvers), as well as repeat player litigants, 
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function with minimal or no oversight from the public, as almost all court- 
and non-court-based dispute resolution proceedings now occur behind 
closed doors. 
In sum, dispute diffusion is underregulated, with its many facets and few 
obligations imposed to provide information.  Private ordering may well 
create good outcomes and good process, but the public cannot learn what it 
does, because we cannot find all the many providers, watch what they do, 
or know of their decisions.  In contrast, courts have to name who their 
judges are, and these individuals gain their positions through public 
processes; their caseloads and budgets are open to the public. 
State and federal courts, as well as administrative agencies, are centrally 
important venues, even as they are deeply flawed.193  Here, as elsewhere, I 
need to reiterate that I am not arguing that courts are ideal.  More than that, 
barriers to entry—with lawyers’ fees high on the list—pose obstacles to 
their use.  As Gillian Hadfield put it:  “The vast majority of ordinary 
Americans lack any real access to the legal system for resolving their claims 
and the claims made against them.”194  Further, courts themselves can be 
exploitative, as Peter Holland recounted in his essay on “junk justice.”  He 
examined 4,400 lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland courts; 
unrepresented debtors regularly defaulted on amounts owed (averaging 
about $3,000), and those decisions were made without trials, lawyers, or 
much judicial oversight.195 
A recent spate of litigation related to court-user fees and fines for those 
with limited resources has exposed injuries imposed by courts, producing 
“endless debt cycles and the imprisonment of some for the failure to 
pay.”196  Now famously, the Department of Justice in 2015 exposed the 
failures of the municipal court in Ferguson, Missouri;197 rather than 
“administering justice or protecting the rights of the accused,” the local 
court’s goal was “maximizing revenue” through “constitutionally deficient” 
procedures that had a racially biased impact.198 
But what I have just detailed as courts’ failures are also tributes to courts, 
obliged to function in public and therefore as a resource for being able to 
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uncover how they sometimes fail.  State and federal judiciaries are required 
to maintain records and to permit public observation—opening paths to 
correct injustices, if popular will to do so exists.199  The structure of courts 
has the potential to provide egalitarian redistribution of authority and the 
possibility of public oversight of legal authority.  Public access permits 
windows into knowing whether fair treatment is accorded regardless of 
status.  Public processes enable judges to demonstrate their independence.  
Oversight permits the policing of judges, tasked with vindicating public 
rights, to ensure the loyalty to those norms.  As I write, we are being given 
a lesson in the value of independent judges, protected from the wrath of 
public and private actors and obliged to treat disputants in an equal and 
dignified manner.  These are the hallmarks of legitimate dispute resolution.  
And through all such public activity, debates can take place about what the 
legal norms and what the fair procedures to apply should be.  
Long ago, Jeremy Bentham railed against “Judge[s] & Co.,” by whom he 
meant lawyers who had through the common law created an opaque and 
self-serving system that benefited themselves.200  The hope is that the 
democratic practices of the last two centuries have shifted the utility 
calculus of judges and lawyers.  The richness and depth of the contributions 
to the colloquium interrogate whether paths to reviving public adjudication 
can be paved.  The question is whether lawyers will be part of a social 
movement, infusing the alternative regimes that now dominate the 
landscape of civil litigation with an ethos of public obligation to redress the 
inequalities in our body politic. 
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